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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dale Patterson pied guilty to two counts of 
delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), as well as a sentencing 
enhancement (five years fixed) under I.C. § 37-2739B(b)(i) for having a prior conviction 
for a similar offense. The district court interpreted J.C. § 37-2739B as creating a true 
mandatory minimum sentence and, therefore, it ruled that it had no discretion to 
suspend the five year fixed sentence, or retain jurisdiction over Mr. Patterson. 
Ultimately, it imposed (and executed) two concurrent unified sentences of fifteen years, 
with five years fixed. The district court explained that, in its view, the fixed portion of 
those sentences was required to be imposed and executed under section 37-2739B but, 
even if such a mandatory minimum did not exist, it would have exercised its discretion in 
favor of the sentence ultimately given anyway. 
Mr. Patterson appealed. He argues first that the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing, and ordering into execution, the sentence that it did. As part of 
this argument, he contends that, given the record in this case, the district court should 
' 
have granted him an opportunity to earn a chance at probation by placing him in the 
retained jurisdiction ("rider") program. Mr. Patterson also argues that the district court 
erred in concluding that a rider was not a legal sentencing option in this case. 
In response, the State argues that the district court did not abuse its sentencing 
discretion (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-14) and that a rider or a suspended sentence was 
not permissible under section 37-2739B anyway (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-11 ). In 
support of the latter argument (which the State actually presents first in its brief), the 
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State argues that both the plain language of section 37-27398, and its legislative 
history, require that it be read to create a true mandatory minimum, i.e., a fixed 
minimum sentence which can never be suspended. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-11.) 
The present Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments regarding 
the proper interpretation of section 37-27398. For the reasons set forth below, 
Mr. Patterson contends that the plain language of that statute, as well as its legislative 
history, requires that it be interpreted to require a fixed minimum sentence which can, in 
the discretion of the district court, be suspended. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in 
Mr. Patterson's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its sentencing discretion by imposing upon 
Mr. Patterson a sentence which is excessive given any view of the facts? 
2. May a defendant receive retained jurisdiction, or a suspended sentence, upon 
imposition of a "fixed minimum" sentence pursuant to I.C. § 37-2739B? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion By Imposing Upon Mr. Patterson 
Sentences Which Are Excessive Given Any View Of The Facts 
Insofar as the State contends that this district court did not abuse its discretion in 
sentencing Mr. Patterson to two concurrent unified terms of fifteen years, with five years 
fixed (see Respondent's Brief, pp.11-14), the State's argument is unremarkable and, 
therefore, requires no further response. Mr. Patterson simply refers the Court back to 
pages 10 through 12 of his Appellant's Brief, wherein he explained why, in fact, the 
foregoing sentences represent an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
11. 
A Defendant May Receive Retained Jurisdiction, Or A Suspended Sentence, Upon 
Imposition Of A "Fixed Minimum" Sentence Pursuant To I.C. § 37-2739B 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Patterson argued that, because I.C. § 37-2739B 
requires the sentencing court to impose at least a five year fixed sentence in certain 
situations, but not does require the sentencing court 'to order that sentence into 
execution, the district court in this case erred when it held that, as a matter of law, it was 
unable to suspend Mr. Patterson's sentence and place him on probation, or to retain 
jurisdiction over Mr. Patterson. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-16.) Specifically, Mr. Patterson 
argued that, since section 37-2739B contains no express language forbidding the 
sentencing court from suspending the defendant's sentence, the court's power to 
suspend sentences should be preserved. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.) In making this 
argument, he compared section 37-2739B to Idaho's persistent violator statute, 
I.C. § 19-2514, which, based on its lack of an express prohibition against suspension of 
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the sentence imposed, has been interpreted to allow the suspension of the sentence, 
and contrasted it with certain other Idaho statutes which call for true mandatory 
minimum sentences by specifically forbidding the suspension of the sentence imposed. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.) 
In response, the State argues that, because section 37-2739B clearly and 
unambiguously precludes the district court from suspending the sentence it imposes, 
the district court in this case did not err. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4, 5-7, 9-10.) 
Alternatively, the State argues, the district court did not err because the legislative 
history of section 37-2739B indicates that it was meant to preclude the district court 
from suspending the sentence imposed. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-9, 10.) Both of 
these arguments, however, are without merit. 
With regard to the question of whether the meaning of section 37-2739B is clear 
and unambiguous, the State is correct only insofar as it recognizes that this inquiry is 
the starting point for evaluating any statute. It correctly notes that if the plain language 
of section 37-2739B is clear, this Court must apply that plain language; however, if the 
plain language of section 37-2739B is not clear, this Court must resort to traditional 
rules of statutory construction.1 State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 191, 824 P.2d 120, 
122 (1992). 
The State argues that the language of section 37-2739B clearly and 
unambiguously requires that any sentence imposed pursuant to the sentencing 
1 While the plain language of a statute will generally control, it will not govern if "clearly 
expressed legislative intent is contrary or [if the] plain meaning leads to absurd results." 
George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 
(1990). 
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enhancement described therein be ordered into execution because section 37-27398 
states that the "defendant 'shall not be eligible for parole or discharge' and that 'each 
fixed minimum term shall be served consecutively."' (Respondent's Brief, p.6 (quoting 
I.C. § 37-2739B(c)) (emphasis in the State's brief).) However, the State is flatly 
incorrect. First, the fact that section 37-2739B(c) prohibits "parole or discharge or credit 
or reduction of sentence for good conduct" during the "fixed minimum term of 
confinement imposed under this section" merely emphasizes the fact that the sentence 
imposed under section 37-27398 is "fixed," as that term is traditionally used under Idaho 
law; it does not call for the sentence imposed to necessarily be ordered into execution. 
Second, the fact that the statute requires that "[e]ach fixed minimum term imposed shall 
be served consecutively to the others, and consecutively to any minimum term of 
confinement imposed for the substantive offense" merely makes it clear the fixed 
minimum sentences provided for in section 37-27398 cannot be concurrent sentences; 
it does not mean that those sentences have to be ordered into execution. 
The State's arguments notwithstanding, there is nothing in the plain text of 
section 37-27398 which would prohibit a sentencing court from suspending the 
enhanced sentence and placing the defendant on probation. As was noted in 
Mr. Patterson's Appellant's Brief (pp.15-16), the Idaho statutes that do contain such 
prohibitions are very explicit about them. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 19-25208 (imposing a five-
year mandatory minimum sentence for certain repeat sex offenders, and specifically 
stating that "[a] court shall not have the power to suspend, withhold, retain jurisdiction, 
or commute a mandatory minimum sentence imposed pursuant to this section"); 
37-2732B(a) (imposing various mandatory minimum fixed sentences for drug trafficking, 
7 
and specifically stating that "adjudication of guilt or the imposition or execution of 
sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld"). 
The reality, therefore, is that section 37-2739B is ambiguous. State v. 
Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 990 P.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1999), although not dealing 
specifically with section 37-2739B, is nevertheless instructive. In that case, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that Idaho's persistent violator statute, J.C.§ 19-2514, is 
ambiguous. See id. at 566-67, 990 P.2d at 147-48. Because the persistent violator 
statute is analogous to section 37-2739B, in that it provides for a minimum sentence 
(although not a fixed minimum sentence) under certain circumstances, but is completely 
silent as to whether that minimum sentence can be suspended, a similar result should 
obtain in this case. If a certain type of sentencing provision is ambiguous in the context 
of enhanced punishments for repeat offenses generally, then certainly the same type of 
sentencing provision is equally ambiguous in the context of enhanced punishments for 
repeat drug offenses under section 37-2739B(b)(1). 
As noted above, if a statute is ambiguous, the reviewing court must turn to 
traditional rules of statutory construction in order to define the contours of that statute. 
Twin Falls County v. Cities of Twin Falls and Filer, 143 Idaho 398, 402, 146 P.3d 664, 
668 (2006). In so doing, the reviewing court "has the duty to ascertain the legislative 
intent and give effect to that intent. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only 
must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, 
the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." Id. However, when it 
comes to the interpretation of criminal statutes, the rule of lenity dictates criminal 
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statutes should be strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 
379, 380, 859 P.2d 1387, 1388 (1993). 
With regard to the legislative history and the legislative intent of section 
37-2739B, the State directs this Court's attention to: (a) the first subsection of section 
37-2739B, and (b) the statement of purpose attached to the bill that would eventually be 
signed into law and codified as section 37-2739B. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) 
The State argues that because both of these sources evidence the intent of the Idaho 
Legislature to better protect society from drug dealers, presumably by punishing them 
more severely than they were being punished under prior law, section 37-2739B should 
be given the harshest possible interpretation, i.e., it should be read to call for not only 
imposition of fixed minimum sentences, but also execution of those fixed minimum 
sentences. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.) However, there are two significant flaws 
with this argument. First, it is patently illogical; it overlooks the fact that the purpose of 
virtually every criminal statute is to provide greater protection for society. Under the 
State's argument, therefore, every criminal statute would have to be construed in the 
State's favor because, after all, the purpose of such statutes is to protect society. 
Second, the State's argument ignores and, indeed, when taken its logical conclusion, 
flies in the face of, the rule of lenity. As the Court of Appeals held in Harrington, where 
a statute calls for imposition of a minimum sentence, but is ambiguous insofar as it is 
silent on the question of whether that minimum sentence must be ordered into 
execution, the rule of lenity dictates that the statute be construed in whatever way 
provides the most leniency for the defendant. Harrington, 133 Idaho at 566 & n.5, 990 
P.2d at 147 & n.5. "Where there has been no legislative action declaring a mandatory 
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minimum term of imprisonment, thusly canceling a court's power to suspend sentences, 
such power to suspend should be preserved." Id. at 566 n.5, 990 P.2d at 147 n.5. 
In this case, therefore, the rule of lenity must be applied and, under Harrington, that rule 
clearly calls for an interpretation of section 37-2739B that allows the district court judge 
to suspend the fixed minimum sentences provided for under that statute. 
Finally, it is important to note that, contrary to the State's implication (see 
Respondent's Brief, p.6}, there is nothing in State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 935 P.2d 
174 (Ct. App. 1996), which would support the State's argument that section 37-2739B, 
whether ambiguous or not, requires a true mandatory minimum sentence, i.e., one 
which must be ordered into execution and, therefore, may not be suspended. In Ayala, 
the question before the Court of Appeals was whether the minimum fixed sentences 
provided for under section 37-2739B are truly mandatory, or whether they are instead 
discretionary. Ayala, 129 Idaho at 918, 935 P.2d at 181. The Court of Appeals held 
that they are, in fact, mandatory; however, nothing in that decision indicates that those 
sentences have to be ordered into execution. See id. Accordingly, contrary to the 
State's implication, Ayala is simply not relevant to the present case. 
In light of all the foregoing, this Court should hold that section 37-2739B does not 
require that the fixed minimum sentences imposed under that statute be ordered into 
execution, and that such sentences may, therefore, in the discretion of the district court, 
be suspended. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Patterson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand his 
case with an instruction that he be granted a rider and, thus, given an opportunity to 
earn a chance to be placed on probation. Alternatively, if this Court determines that a 
rider is not possible in this case, he requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate 
portion of his sentence, or that it find that his current sentence is excessive and remand 
his case for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 10th day of, 2009. 
I. HTINEN 
Deputy State Appellate ublic Defender 
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